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ABSTRACT
KATHERINE M. MCKIERNAN: Municipal Governance and Democratic Perceptions:
The Role of Party Competition and Municipal Governance on Evaluations of Democracy
(Under the direction of Evelyne Huber.)
This paper seeks to explore the role of municipal political experiences in shaping percep-
tions of national level democracy. I argue that the variation in citizens’ perceptions of qual-
ity of democracy can be explained using municipal-level democratic cues. In addition to
evaluating democracy based on national level elections, institutions, and trends, citizens are
likely to determine the level on democracy based on immediate, observable democracy at
the level of government closest to themselves. I use a multilevel model in order to evaluate
how the structure of municipal electoral competition and government investment patterns
affect individual perceptions of democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
When third party observers evaluate the quality of democracy in newly developed
democracies, they do so using a range of indicators for democratic institutions and pro-
cesses. However, these outside evaluations fail to consider the perceptions of citizens
living within the regime. Citizens’ perceptions of the quality of democracy illustrate their
relative acceptance of the regime at large. If citizens have favorable perceptions of national-
level democracy, they are likely to work within the current institutions rather than demand
changes in democratic structures. These perceptions depend on whether governments are
meeting citizens expectations for democracy. In new democracies, citizens will adopt a
minimalist definition of what it means to be democratic, focusing most on free and fair
elections while in older democracies, citizens are likely to expect higher levels of civil
rights (Brinks, Leiras and Mainwaring 2014). In this paper, I explore how citizens’ experi-
ences with political institutions, procedures, and investment influence their evaluations of
national quality of democracy.
Citizens evaluations of democracy are likely shaped by their interactions with govern-
ment officials and processes. This offers clear implications for policy makers: where ex-
periences with governments are positive, citizens will be more likely to favorably evaluate
the political system whereas when evaluations are negative, citizens are less likely to see
high levels of democracy or experience high levels of trust. Traditionally, perceptions have
been explained using a number of individual-level characteristics that seek to explore how
capable citizens are of evaluating their governments (Carlin and Zechmeister 2015). Fur-
thermore, citizen’s perceptions of democracy can be explained using national level cues
such as the state of the economy and perceived corruption. However, the literature provides
little insight on how variation in sub-state governance affects citizens’ evaluations of the
quality of democracy in the regime 1 .
I argue that citizens’ perceptions of the quality of democracy are affected by municipal-
level cues. Citizens use experiences with local governments as information shortcuts to as-
sess the quality of national-level governance and institutions. Thus, variation in municipal-
level governance helps to explain within-state variation in citizens’ perceptions of the qual-
ity of the regime’s democracy. I argue that when political elites facilitate municipal demo-
cratic elections, build strong municipal infrastructures, and implement policies that improve
citizens quality of life, citizens are more likely to see the entire country as democratic.
When classifying democracies, there are many countries with weak democratic institu-
tions that do not cleanly fit the category of democracy or autocracy. In weak democracies
and hybrid regimes, there is variance in the number of voices in the political system, the
level of competition, and the level of democracy within the country (Gibson 2005; Gin-
gerich 2013; Giraudy 2010). These differences increase the importance of municipal cues
since they help to capture the within-country variance in democracy. When a citizen lives
in an authoritarian pocket, they may see their country as less democratic than those citi-
zens living in municipalities with stronger cues that democracy is “working”. Municipal
cues, therefore, may act as a key source of information for citizens about the political pro-
cess and its effectiveness. Citizens are likely to evaluate the effectiveness of governance
based on immediate needs: financial situations, infrastructure, and access to public goods
(Faguet 2014; Gingerich 2013). Since this access is provided by municipal-level govern-
ments, citizens may use these municipal experiences to derive information about the quality
of national-level democracy.
In this paper, I test my theory that citizens use municipal-level cues to evaluate national
quality of democracy in the context of municipal elections in Colombia. Colombia is a hard
test of the theory: it is a unitary government where there is a great deal of autonomy given
to local governments, but they are not legally classified as a federation with a distinct realm
of authority reserved to departments and municipalities. This creates a conservative test for
1 The Geographic Variance is detailed in the Data and Methods Section in Figure 2 and Figure 4
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the effect of municipal-level cues where municipal characteristics include both mandated
and discretionary investment across levels of governance. I run a multi-level model includ-
ing both individual-level factors that contribute to perceptions of the quality of democracy
and two types of municipal cues: process-based cues, focusing on elections, and results-
based cues focused on investment in government services. These measures seek to address
signals sent by municipal governments about a commitment to meeting basic needs and the
structure of party competition. In newly formed democracies, elections constitute the most
basic definition of democracy, so a focus on elections represents a minimum threshold for
building democratic regimes.
Evaluating Quality of Democracy
Scholars have used various different measures to evaluate the quality of democracy in
newly democratic regions. These measures focus on two dimensions of democracy: proce-
dure and results. Procedural components of democracy are characterized by the institution-
alization of democratic processes such as the rule of law, accountability, and responsiveness
while results are focused on the freedoms afforded to citizens and the pursuit of equality in
policy implementation (Morlino 2004). Although both dimensions affect citizens’ percep-
tions of the quality of democracy in the regime, there is little understanding about how their
effects differ.
A central puzzle in evaluating quality of democracy is how best to distinguish between
democratic procedures and democratic results. Traditional measures of democracy often
focus on the level of democracy, which prioritize democratic procedures as a precondi-
tion for democratic outcomes. This is evident in the unidimensional scales of democracy
employed by both Polity and Freedom House measures (Altman and Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n 2002).
However, focusing on procedures restricts our ability to broadly conceptualize variations
in democracy. In new democracies, this problem is especially prevalent since competitive
elections are often introduced before institutions that establish rule of law, civil society, and
accountability (Rose and Shin 2001). Thus, democratic institutions are able to survive in
authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, authoritarian and hybrid regimes often use elections
3
as a way to enhance their own legitimacy, without truly practicing democratic governance
(Brownlee 2009; Diamond 2002; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Howard and Roessler 2006;
Magaloni 2006). Scholars have sought to overcome this issue by disaggregating the compo-
nents of democratic governance. For example, Levine and Molina (2011) measure quality
of democracy as the development of basic elements of democratic governance, which com-
bines an electoral dimension, a participation dimension, accountability, responsiveness, and
government sovereignty. Yet this approach continues to ignore the importance of citizens
perceptions of democracy (Brinks, Leiras and Mainwaring 2014).
Considering perceptions of the quality of democracy allows scholars to account for
citizens’ changing expectations for democratic governance as a democracy ages. In new
democracies, citizens adopt a minimalist definition of what it means to be democratic, fo-
cusing primarily on free and fair elections, while in older democracies, citizens are likely
to expect more expansive civil liberties and social welfare (Brinks, Leiras and Mainwaring
2014). I focus on perceptions of the quality of democracy, therefore, to account for citizens
contextual understandings of democracy. This allows me to better evaluate how municipal
experiences influence national-level evaluations of democracy.
Introducing additional levels of government further complicates how to best evaluate
quality of democracy. Subnational governance likely affects perceptions of the quality of
democracy because it introduces within-state geographic variation into citizens’ experi-
ences with local institutions. When democratizing reforms are introduced at the local level,
such as participatory budgeting, village councils, or increased electoral competition, these
changes to government institutions, procedures, and policies positively affect how citizens’
feel about the regime in which they live (Truex 2014; Manion 1996; Malesky and Schuler
2010).
Government decentralization also produces variation in the implementation of policy,
the structure of governing institutions, and the quality of democracy across municipalities.
In federal states, regions have institutionalized autonomy over some government functions
(Riker 1964). In unitary states, however, the central government often still extends govern-
ing power to locally elected municipal leaders. We see here that experiences with municipal
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governance should matter across various types of formal power sharing agreements.
Scholars offer a variety of perspectives on how and to what extent municipal-level insti-
tutions and governance affect citizens’ perceptions of the nation’s overall quality of democ-
racy. Some argue that democratic governance can be improved by increasing participatory
venues to provide citizens with greater accountability and responsiveness from their rep-
resentatives (Faguet 2014). However, the extent to which these reforms affect citizens’
perceptions regarding the quality of democracy depends largely on the outcome of policy
reforms. Faguet (2014) asserts that although the transference of power to municipal govern-
ments and the enactment of institutional reforms may threaten fiscal stability, they generally
improve the quality of democratic governance. In turn, these reforms improve perceived
levels of democracy. Truex (2014) finds that this logic has limits, however, since citizens
have non-uniform expectations for democracy. Thus, elites are only able to manipulate
citizen satisfaction with and support for regimes in limited subsamples of the population
through municipal-level reforms.
Furthermore, scholars show that the size of a municipality affects how citizens evalu-
ate of the quality of their regime’s democracy. In smaller municipalities, citizens are more
likely to see themselves as having real power in government (Lassen and Serritzlew 2011).
Thus, citizens perceptions of the quality of democracy should be higher in smaller munici-
palities.
Decentralization has led to questions about how some authoritarian governments man-
age to persist in regions, regardless of national-level democracy. These regimes are not
reproduced by the central government for continued support (Giraudy 2010), but rather
are able to survive by practicing “boundary control” that minimizes their interaction with
surrounding democratic regions and focuses on maximizing subnational autonomy (Gib-
son 2005). The opposite trend, subnational units that uphold democratic principles within
traditionally authoritarian states, is also possible (Gilley 2010). Subnational units can be-
have as either “authoritarian pockets” or “democratic enclaves”, but are constrained by the
national-level government within which they operate due to the order of decentralization
and restrictions on fiscal autonomy and economic capacity (Falleti 2005; Gonza´lez 2012;
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Gingerich 2013). In the case of authoritarian pockets, the national government will rarely
intervene if a provincial government is neither openly authoritarian nor flagrantly violating
human rights (Behrend 2011). Instead, national governments tend to focus on securing nec-
essary support for elections, policy implementations, and approval of legislation (Behrend
2011). Within-regime variance provides a framework for considering how perceptions of
quality of democracy change across subnational units. Democratization reforms are em-
ployed non-uniformly across subnational units, which is likely to increase the variance in
subnational experiences and perceptions of the quality of democracy.
The Role of Municipal Governments
In this paper, I argue that people build their perceptions of the quality of democracy
not only using national-level information, but also by evaluating their experiences at the
municipal level. Municipal governments offer readily-accessible signals concerning the
provision of necessary resources and the implementation of national level policy. In all
states, information about the quality of the regime’s governance can come from a variety
of sources–the news, the economy, personal ideology, and personal preference over elected
representatives can all affect the degree with which people think democracy “works” in
their country. However, access to this information varies between established and weak
democracies. When national-level democracy is weak, I argue that citizens rely more on
municipal-level experiences to determine the quality of national-level democracy.
In weak democracies and hybrid regimes, traditional evaluations of the quality of
democracy are muddled due to coexisting democratic institutions and authoritarian prac-
tices. In the case of hybrid regimes, democratic institutions such as competitive elections
and participatory venues help to increase regime stability (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007;
Lehoucq and Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n 2013). Since democratic institutions can exist in both democra-
cies and autocracies, evaluating the quality of democracy must look beyond institutions.
Although citizens in liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes are likely to reach
a consensus about the level of democracy in their country, in hybrid regimes and elec-
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toral democracies there is greater variation in citizens’ evaluations. The perceived level of
democracy in a country is easily influenced by a country’s experiences with past difficul-
ties establishing democratic regimes and histories of democratic backsliding. Citizens will
use heuristic cues to evaluate elite decisions and democracy (Rodden and Wibbels 2010). I
argue that citizens will respond to local level cues to evaluate national democracy and that
variance in municipal-level democracy helps to explain the variance in citizen perceptions
of the quality of democracy.
Third party observers such as Polity and Freedom House tend to assume that these cues
occur at the national level (Rodden and Wibbels 2010). Uncompetitive elections, national-
level corruption, electoral fraud, and government repression all serve as signs that democ-
ratization is ineffective (Truex 2014; Reuter and Robertson 2012, 2015; Pop-Eleches and
Robertson 2015; Lupu 2014; Morgan 2011). However, a focus on national cues does not
account for the variance in electoral systems within developing and weak democracies that
permit enduring subnational authoritarian pockets (Behrend 2011; Gibson 2005; Giraudy
2010)]. While at the national level there may be limited competition and strong, central-
ized regimes, localities may be the initial locations for democratic reforms and growing
oppositions that signal a potential change in national government structure.
This was the story in Mexico, where the single-party authoritarian regime under the
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) opened a greater space for the opposition in
municipal governments that initially allowed the PRI to maintain national strength, but ul-
timately acted as a catalyst for democratization(Magaloni 2006). Early municipal reforms
gave citizens a space to open up the political system and helped citizens push for greater
democratization. This was possible because citizens’ demands placed on the political sys-
tem changed. Citizens change their demands on elected officials and their expected levels
of responsiveness as their information about the political system changed(Truex 2014). In
Mexico, citizens first began pushing for greater democracy at the subnational level. After
experiencing improvements with regional democracy, citizens pushed for increased levels
of democratic competition at the national level.
In this case, municipal cues may have changed the demands of citizens with respect to
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democratization. In addition to improvements in elections, increased venues for participa-
tion, spaces for deliberation, and evidence of coalitions and cooperation can all signal that
democracy is becoming stronger or more efficient. However, these indicators may not be
evenly distributed across a country. Electoral cues exist in each municipality in both federal
and unitary systems. Municipal governments are often the level of governance closest to the
people and the space where immediate needs are met. This allows municipalities to act as
an accessible venue to derive larger cues about the national quality of democracy by provid-
ing immediate information about political processes and direct experiences to the citizens.
Furthermore, since municipal governments implement national policy, citizens might form
judgments about the success of national-level governments based on their experiences with
municipal governance.
Fig. 1: Theoretical Diagram
Citizens are offered two broad classes of cues that allow them to update their beliefs
about the quality of democracy. The first type of cue is process-oriented, where citi-
zens have direct experiences with the institutions and processes of democratic governance.
Broadly, this includes evidence of separation of powers, law making, and the justice system.
The second cues are results-oriented cues, which focus on the implementation of policies
and the observable results of democratic processes. I argue that both of these cues are likely
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to influence the perception of the quality of democracy (see Figure 1). Quality of democracy
can be evaluated in different ways: as the perceived level of democracy (how democratic is
your country?) or the level of trust in democratic institutions and processes. Thus, I con-
sider the quality of democracy in both ways. While process-based and results-based cues
are both likely to influence the perceived quality of democracy, citizens responses to these
cues will differ. Therefore, both measures of quality of democracy are necessary to see how
citizens evaluations change based on process-based and results-based cues.
Signals concerning the democratic process and democratic results represent citizen’s
ability to see the government providing for their basic needs. Each of these cues captures
one of the two main dimensions of quality of democracy (Morlino 2004; Levine and Molina
2011). I argue that both dimensions–experience with institutions and the observed results–
have the potential to change a citizen’s evaluation of democracy because they allow citizens
to update their beliefs about the political system by offering signs that the system is either
succeeding, representing a high level of democracy, or failing, indicating that democracy is
not meeting the needs of the people. These cues further capture the probability that citizens
will base evaluations on a limited set of experiences that they share with people within their
network.
Process-based cues include venues for citizen participation, evidence of deliberative
measures within the government, and the degrees of civil liberties (Morlino 2004). I chose
to focus on electoral cues because elections are often the first step in democratization. Fur-
thermore, elections send a strong signal about the current state of democracy in two ways.
The first is that elections allow candidates to send a message about policies including which
policies are succeeding, which policies are failing, and which aspects of governance most
need to be addressed. The second signal that elections offer is the level of consensus among
elites. The structure of elections, including the number of candidates competing and their
discourse, sends a signal to voters about the level of convergence and divergence of opin-
ions, the relationships between government officials, and the role of elected officials. These
cues work with national-level information to offer a more nuanced impression of the current
state of democratic institutions. Thus, if citizens are receiving more information about the
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success or failures of democracy at the subnational level than the national level, this infor-
mation is likely to color their interpretation of national democracy. When elections are free,
fair, and competitive, they meet the minimum definition of democracy and send a positive
signal that democratic institutions are functioning. Where elections show evidence of frac-
tionalization, are uncompetitive, or are perceived as corrupt, citizens receive a signal that
democratic institutions are failing. I focus on differences in electoral competition across
municipalities as a simple measure of within-country variance that prioritizes the first tenet
of democracy: free, fair, and competitive elections.
Results-based cues send a more ambiguous signal about the state of democracy. There
are various ways in which citizens evaluate changes in outcomes including access to public
goods, improvements in the standard of living, opportunities available to citizens, and the
efficiency of government services. Where there are improvements in access to goods and
services, I hypothesize that citizens will see this as evidence of successful democracy and
have a more favorable evaluation of the quality of democracy nationally. Conversely, where
citizens see worsening local conditions and services, they are likely to see democracy as
less successful. Measuring results poses questions of how to determine if the government
is meeting the needs of citizens and how to asses questions of credit claiming across levels
of governance. In a decentralized context, municipal governments receive money both via
local taxation and federal transfers. However, municipal governments do not have consis-
tent levels of autonomy in how to invest money that may not be observed by citizens within
the municipality. How funds gained through taxation and transfers are invested offers in-
sights concerning the focus of municipal governments and their ability to provide better
governance through discretionary investment. Focusing on results allows me to account for
subnational variance in democracy where local governments share similar electoral struc-
tures.
Citizens are universally exposed to both types of cues: as residents of a municipality,
citizens receive signals concerning democratic results within the municipality through the
observed quality of public programs, roads and transportation, and interactions with gov-
ernment services. Furthermore, during electoral campaigns they are continuously exposed
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to messages about democracy, regardless of their decision to vote. Together, citizens use
this information to evaluate both the government in power and the political regime.
While these cues exist at the national level, in weak democracies where the national
quality of democracy is unclear, municipal governance is important in giving citizens the
necessary information to interpret their experiences and update their beliefs about national
democracy. Where decentralization reforms offer high levels of autonomy to subnational
governments, subnational cues become even more important since autonomous subnational
governments send signals that might differ from those at the national level. Furthermore,
even where signals overlap, municipal governments are largely responsible for enforcing
national policy, offering a deeper insight into outcomes. This is evident through differences
in the structure of elections across levels of government. Municipal governments are able
to send direct signals concerning outcomes since they are the most immediate providers of
services that citizens interact with regularly.
Empirical Tests and Expectations
In order to test my theory, I create a multi-level model that separates the individual-level
factors that influence perception of quality of democracy from the municipal-level cues
citizens receive about democracy in their country. In the context of a single-country case
study, this model controls for national level cues, which provide constant information to
citizens. In models for both types of cues, my dependent variable is “quality of democracy”
operationalized in two ways: as the perceived level of democracy and as trust in democratic
institutions and processes. Including both dependent variables allows me to separate how
exposure to different cus effects perceived quality of democracy.
My variables of interest are municipal-level democratic cues. Here, I include both
process-based cues and results-based cues. I measure process-based cues as party competi-
tion and restrict my analysis to the number of parties competing for mayor and the margin
of victory that these parties experience. In order to capture results-based cues, I consider
the investment that municipalities commit to social services, municipal infrastructure, the
agricultural sector, and to improving spaces for political participation and development at
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the local level. These categories capture the services most clearly provided by local gov-
ernments.
In Colombia, the process of decentralization gives municipalities autonomy within cer-
tain limits. Municipalities have the exclusive right to tax real property through Decree 1421
in 1993 and its revisions in 1998 and 2005. Municipalities also are responsible for deter-
mining the base and rates of excise taxes. However,each municipality is responsible for
creating a development plan to submit to the federal government for approval to request
additional funds and provide information about ongoing programs and municipal budgets.
Additional autonomy is granted to Bogota´ that allows it to set additional taxes for busi-
nesses. The national government is able to limit the autonomy of municipalities due to the
reliance on fiscal transfers from the central government.
Approximately 70% of the federal budget is designated transfers to municipal govern-
ments. Thus, the majority of investment and spending occurs at the municipal level under
the guidelines and framework designated by the national government. The large proportion
of funds gained through federal transfers offer municipalities autonomy over how to invest
money to meet the needs of their citizens ,but the transfers include guidelines emphasiz-
ing municipalities commitment to following their proposed development plans, focusing
social investment on education and health care, and complying with central government
development plans (Faguet and Sanchez 2008). According to the Constitutional reforms
in 2001, Colombia determines transfers based on relative poverty, population, fiscal effi-
ciency, and administrative efficiency of the municipalities and provides general purpose,
block grant, transfers for water utilities, sports and recreation, culture, and investment The
exact formula for determining transfers is vague, but offers incentives for municipalities
to invest in municipal infrastructure and improve municipal administration to receive more
federal transfers towards social programs. Any city with over 100,000 residents appoints
a comptroller responsible for the municipality’s finances. To demonstrate fiscal efficiency,
municipalities must keep balanced budgets or they are penalized with a reduction in trans-
fers and discretionary funds under the “Traffic Light Law” of 1997. Fiscal transfers include
both earmarked and free funds, with the earmarked funds intended to insure equality in
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access to social programs across municipalities. These funds allow the central government
to intervene for the purpose of greater equality in implementing programs and in active
conflict zones.
At the municipal level, I also control for the municipalities experience with rebel group
takeover to account for experience with the Colombian Civil War, the proportion of the
municipality that is rural, and the size of the municipality.
At the individual level, I consider exposure to news media since the level of interaction
with the news will change a citizen’s knowledge about the national level regime and pro-
vide additional information about the quality of democracy. This increase in available cues
holds regardless of whether the news is state controlled or independent. I also consider the
citizens’ perceptions of the state of the national economy, which is shown to influence their
perception of the government and expect that those who see the economy as better will also
see the country as more democratic. I include whether the citizen voted. While this is a
form of political participation, whether a citizen votes may serve as an indicator for their
trust in the democratic system. Finally, I control for a citizen’s level of education and gen-
der. While there is evidence that citizens may also be influenced by their income, I do not
include this variable because of the high volume of respondents that do not indicate their
income which excludes the wealthiest and poorest respondents from the sample. Instead,
I trust that education is a meaningful proxy for income as is standard in survey research
(Carlin and Zechmeister 2015).
Process-Based Cues
The number of parties competing reflects democracy’s assumption that there should be a
place in politics for various opinions to be heard. However, when too many people compete
for office, we can reasonably assume that citizens will have the opposite concern–if there are
too many candidates, there is a question of whether there can be consensus between elites
seeking influence. As a result, I expect that an increase in parties will initially improve
perceptions of the quality of democracy, but, after reaching a certain number of parties,
there will be a decrease in perceived quality of democracy. This suggests that there is
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an optimal number of parties competing for office that will maximize perceived quality
of democracy. Where only one party competes, people receive cues that there is minimal
competition. Conversely, where many fragmented parties compete, citizens receive the
opposite message that there is little government consensus and efficiency. Thus, a non-
linear relationship should emerge. Furthermore, in a democracy, we expect that elections
are competitive rather than nominal. Thus, more competitive elections should lead to higher
perceptions of the quality of democracy. I measure competitiveness by subtracting the
percent of the vote received by the party receiving the second most votes from the percent
of votes received by the winning political party.
This interpretation of process-based cues leads to two related hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: As the number of parties competing for office increases, perceptions of
the quality of democracy will increase initially and decrease with the addition of additional
parties. This hypothesis assumes a “crowding out” effect in which there are too many
political parties in the system and trust in electoral processes should decrease.
Hypothesis 1b: As an election becomes more competitive, citizens’ perceptions of the
quality of democracy will improve.
Results-Based Cues
I use investment in various government services and programs to proxy results-based
cues since investment represents a commitment to various municipal services 2 . When
considering investment categories, I consider the investment per capita in each municipal-
ity. This allows me to capture a comparable measure of how much, per person, municipal
governments invest in services. I argue that where investment in each of these services is
higher, perceptions of the quality of democracy will also be higher. This test assumes that
greater levels of investment per capita acts as a proxy for commitment to providing different
government services. For example, higher levels of investment in municipal political devel-
2 A potential criticism of this measure is that investment might better represent municipal capacity. How-
ever, higher levels of capacity should be correlated with the ability to provide higher quality governance.
Furthermore, since the degree of investment that is earmarked is inconsistent across municipalities, variance
in investments should represent municipal governance
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opment indicates greater commitment to opening spaces for local political engagement and
participation.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: As investment in the agricultural sector, municipal political development,
social services, and municipal infrastructure increase, citizens’ perceptions of the quality
of democracy will improve. In municipalities with large rural populations, the effect of
agricultural investment will be larger.
Since municipal-level GDP data is not available, I focus on absolute GDP per capita to
allow for the variance in available funds in each municipality due to available tax revenue
and the degree of federal transfers.
I test this theory in the context of Colombia because it is a hard test for the theory. If
there is evidence that municipal level factors drive perceptions of democracy in a unitary
country–where there is lower constitutional separation between the municipalities and the
central government–than it may suggest that municipal level cues will continue to have an
effect in federal states. Colombia’s vague rules concerning fiscal transfers and municipal
autonomy force municipalities to compete for funds by showing fiscal responsibility via
balanced municipal budgets. Furthermore, unlike in federal states where the effects of
authoritarian pockets have been studied, there have not been studies exploring potential
authoritarian pockets within Colombia, where the level of democracy is assumed to be
consistent across the country. Despite these conditions, there is a high level of variance in
how democratic respondents see Colombia. Geographic variance in respondents may be
explained by differences across Colombian municipalities.
Data and Methods
I test this theory using two sets of data. First, in order to consider perceptions of democ-
racy and individual factors, I use data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project
(LAPOP) for Colombia from the 2008 and 2012 surveys ((N.d.) LAPOP). With these rounds
of surveys, I remove 2010 because it was a national election year, and thus I expect the fo-
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cus of citizens to be on national, rather than municipal, cues. Excluding a national election
year, therefore, allows me to focus on respondents average evaluations of the quality of
democracy when national-level information is constant. I would expect that a national-level
election year would take the focus from municipal-level cues to national-level cues and the
effect of municipal-level cues on citizens’ evaluations would disappear.
The use of LAPOP survey data allows me to identify perceptions of the quality of
democracy, respondents’ access to news media, perceptions of the national economy, per-
ceptions of corruption, and whether or not the respondent voted. I am also able to identify
respondents levels of education and their gender. The LAPOP survey is used to construct
my dependent variables and to control for demographic characteristics of the respondents.
In order to evaluate the municipal cues for democracy, I use municipal panel data col-
lected through Universidad de los Andes’ Center for Economic Development (Facultad de
Economia: Centro de Datos 2015). My subset of data includes the absolute investment in
different municipal services for 2004-2008 and mayoral election data from the 2007 and
2011 elections in each of the 1119 municipalities in Colombia. The investment data is re-
ported in thousands of pesos. The election data provides the names and political parties of
each candidate, the raw votes for each candidate and the number of ballots that were dis-
counted because they were either invalid, left blank, or were never cast. Furthermore, this
dataset includes demographic characteristics for each municipality such as the total popu-
lation broken down by urban and rural populations. With this data, I will measure lagged
effects of investment per capita and two waves of local elections. I only include observa-
tions of municipalities from which there are survey respondents, which allows me to test
81 total municipalities for process-based cues and 53 total municipalities for results-based
cues. The reduced number of municipalities for results-based cues occurs because I only
look at a single round of LAPOP survey data. 3 .
3 Using LAPOP survey methods, the respondents are voting-aged individuals from each of the geographic
regions of Colombia. In 2008, these respondents were stratified geographically, pulled from municipalities,
and clustered as urban or rural. In 2012, this survey changed to better capture within-municipality variance and
increase the number of sampling points within municipalities. Across both waves of surveys, one respondent
per household is interviewed but institutionalized individuals (including those in boarding schools, hospitals,
police academies, military barracks, and county jails) are excluded. Each non-institutionalized voting age
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My dependent variable in my models is “Perception of the Quality of Democracy”.
I divide this variable into two component parts: perceived level of democracy and trust
in democratic institutions and processes. Perceived level of democracy provides an over-
all measure of citizens’ perception of the quality of the regime’s democracy whereas trust
in democratic institutions provides a more nuanced representation of citizens’ experiences
with democratic governance. These two components also reflect citizens’ distinct responses
to policy outcomes versus satisfaction with governing institutions. I measure level of
democracy using a LAPOP survey question that directly asks “In your opinion, is (Colom-
bia) very democratic, somewhat democratic, a little democratic, or not democratic? 4 ”.
I recode this variable so that 1 represents “not democratic” and 4 represents “very demo-
cratic”. Although this question asks directly about democracy, the respondent’s evaluation
is likely influenced by both his or her experience with governance and preference for the
current leadership. When considering responses for perceived level of democracy in 1, most
respondents chose category 3, “somewhat democratic”, but about as many respondents see
Colombia as “very democratic” as those that see Colombia as “a little democratic” 5 . I also
divide the perception of democracy geographically to see the variance of the proportion of
respondents who evaluate the level of democracy as “not democratic” and “very democratic
in each municipality. In Figure 2, each bar represents a municipality and the proportion of
respondents who see Colombia as “not democratic” varies from 0 to just over 15% while
the respondents who see Colombia as “very democratic” ranges from 0 to just over 70%.
My second dependent variable is an index of questions pertaining to independent com-
ponents of democracy. This index captures the level of trust in democratic institutions and
processes, and is correlated with the perception of the level of democracy at r = 0.32.
person has an equal probability of being included in the survey sample. Each subsample is drawn from
stratified regions, municipal size, and urban/rural regions to avoid excluding subgroups from geographic
regions, different sized municipalities, or the capital city due to the random sample. My sample is equivalent
to the LAPOP samples for 2008 and 2012.
4 For each survey question, the questions are translated from Spanish to English
5 I produce the summary statistics based on my largest sample that will be tested, for the election
hypotheses
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Level of Democracy Proportion of Responses
Not Democratic .046
A Little Democratic .232
Somewhat Democratic .501
Very Democratic .221
Table 1: Responses for Level of Democracy
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Fig. 2: Geographic Variance in Responses for Level of Democracy
Respondents were asked to rate how much they agree with a series of statements from 1-
meaning not at all, to 7- meaning completely. I include the following questions:
1. To what extent do you respect your political institutions?
2. To what point do you have confidence in elections?
3. To what extent do you have confidence in political parties?
4. To what extent do you believe that political parties represent you?
5. To what extent do you believe that your basic rights as a citizen are protected by the
political system?
6. To what point do you believe the government promotes and protects democratic prin-
ciples?
7. To what extent are you proud to live in your political system?
18
8. To what extent do you believe that you can help the political system?
I include each of these questions because they reflect trust in electoral dimensions of
democracy, representation, and commitment to democratic principles. Questions one and
two capture citizens’ feelings about democratic institutions while questions three and four
capture how well institutions represent the population. Questions five and six explore
whether citizens believe, broadly, that the country upholds democratic standards and re-
spects rights. Finally, questions seven and eight consider whether citizens have political
efficacy and relative support for their political regime. Combined, these questions create a
comprehensive assessment of the level of respect in institutions, the commitment of the po-
litical system to upholding democratic principals, belief in democracy at large, and the level
of representation in the political system. Each question, therefore, contributes to a compre-
hensive understanding of the quality of democracy from both an individual and institutional
level.
While the trust variable would benefit from including more information in trust for
each branch of government, the ultimate goal of this variable, to capture the quality of
democracy, is better realized by focusing on questions concerning the political system at
large, institutionalized parties, support for democracy, and efficacy to avoid the instability
of trust in weak institutions based on who currently holds power. Question seven might also
tap into nationalism, but the benefit of including relative pride for the political system is that
it looks at the system at large rather than separating each component part of democracy. The
alternative, including questions about support for the presidency, congress, and the supreme
court, risks capturing fleeting support based on partisan affiliations or rule of law rather
than trust in democracy. Pride in the political system, therefore, taps into feelings about the
entire political system. Furthermore, pride in the political system can indicate support for
democracy as opposed to alternate forms of government. Similarly, question eight might
also tap into optimism, but it explores the degree to which citizens believe their vote holds
value. 6
6 When the tests are repeated with pride removed from the index, the results are consistent.
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This variable is built using an additive index where each question contributes to 1/8 of
the total score for perceptions of the quality of democracy. Using Stata to create this index,
I find that the answers track together reliably at α = 0.83. This method creates a continuous
scale ranging from 1 to 7 where 1 is no trust in institutions and 7 is the highest level of trust
in institutions. The correlation between these eight questions can be seen in Figure 2.
Question 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Respect Institutions 1.00
Rights Protected 0.41 1.00
Proud 0.46 0.57 1.00
Can Help System 0.48 0.44 0.63 1.00
Confidence in Parties 0.22 0.35 0.34 0.30 1.00
Promotes and Protects Principles 0.33 0.36 0.42 0.38 0.29 1.00
Political Parties Representative 0.19 0.33 0.30 0.26 0.36 0.34 1.00
Confidence in Elections 0.28 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.41 0.38 0.33 1.00
Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Component Questions
In addition to a correlation matrix, I run a factor analysis to see if these questions are
capturing the same underlying latent variable. The factor analysis shows ambiguity over
whether these questions are best represented as one or two factors. The Eigen Test, which
is most commonly used, suggests that these components represent two factors with R2
values of 0.72 and 0.61. However, a parallel analysis, optimal coordinates analysis, and
acceleration factor test all suggest that these questions are best represented as a single factor
with a R2 value of 0.84. This suggests that each question is tapping into a single dimension
and can be included in a single index.
The overall distribution of trust in democratic institutions and processes can be seen in
Figure 3 and the municipal variance in the highest and lowest evaluations can be seen in
Figure 4. Municipalities range from 0 to 25% of the respondents exhibiting low levels of
trust and 0 to just under 30% showing high levels of trust.
In order to operationalize the individual-level variables, I evaluate exposure to news
media by considering two sets of questions. In 2008, citizens were asked how often they
listened to the news on the radio, watched the news on TV, read the news in the newspaper,
or read the news on-line as four separate questions. In 2012, however, they were asked
whether they did any of the above in a single question. Both ways the questions were asked
20
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Fig. 3: Distribution of Trust in Democratic Institutions and Processes
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Fig. 4: Geographic Variance in Responses for Trust in Democratic Institutions and Processes
were coded 1, everyday, 2, one to two times a week, 3, rarely, or 4, never. In order to make
these questions comparable, I convert the 2008 survey so that if any of the types of media are
coded as 1, then exposure to media is coded 1, indicating that the person accessed a news
source everyday. Similarly, if the most exposure to media is coded 2, then the exposure
overall is coded 2. By extracting the code indicating the most access to news media, I am
able to make these variables comparable across survey years. I invert the scale so that an
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Question 1 2 3 4 5 yes no
News Access .011 .066 .145 .777
Economic Perceptions .063 .249 .520 .157 .011
Voted .644 .356
Perception of Corruption .029 .133 .328 .510
Rebel Occupation .606 .393
Table 3: Proportion of Respondents for Each Control
increase in categories corresponds with an increase in how frequently respondents consume
the news. In my sample, respondents news access can be found in Table 3, showing that
most respondents consume some form of news daily.
For perception of the national economy, I use the question “How would you evaluate
the economic situation of (Colombia)?” This question is asked on a 5-point scale where
1 is very good, 2 is good, 3 is neither good nor poor, 4 is poor, and 5 is very poor. I
invert this scale so that 5 represents a very good economy. In Table 3, most citizens see
the economy as neither good nor poor. Whether a citizen voted is coded as 1 for yes and 0
for no and more than half of the respondents voted in Table 3. I also include a variable for
perception of corruption that is coded from 1, not widespread, to 4, very widespread, where
most respondents saw corruption as “very widespread” in Table 3. Finally, I use Education
as a proxy for income in order to account for the high proportion of missing data on the
income question. Education is measured as the last year of schooling that the respondent
completed, where most respondents had ten years of schooling in Figure 5.
Municipal level electoral variables are operationalized using the 2007 mayoral elec-
tions, which should affect the 2008 surveys and the 2011 elections that should affect the
2012 surveys while investment variables for 2004-2008 are paired with the 2008 elections.
In order to evaluate the number of voices in the elections, I count the number of candidates
competing for mayor. This variable does not include write-in candidates or unmarked bal-
lots. In order to evaluate the margin of victory, I convert raw votes to percentage of the total
vote and subtract the percent of votes the second-place candidate received from the percent
of the vote that the winning candidate received. For investment, I include investment per
capita in agriculture, political development, social programs, and infrastructure. I consider
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investment four ways: as a one year lag, as the difference between two years to account
for change in investment, as average investment over the prior two years, and as average
investment from 2004-2008. These categories allow time for any programs or results of the
investment to be witnessed and to consider immediate changes in investment. In order to
further control for differences between municipalities, I include the logged population of
the municipality, the proportion of the population that is rural, and a dummy variable to
represent whether a municipality has experienced occupation by a rebel group during the
Colombian Civil War.
In most municipalities, only a handful of parties compete, but there are municipalities
with up to fourteen independent parties as seen in Figure 6. Many of these elections were
also decided by a very small margin of victory, as seen in Figure 7. When evaluating invest-
ment, most respondents live in a municipality with low levels of investment in agriculture,
political development, and municipal infrastructure while many respondents see high levels
of social investment, as seen in Figure 8. The high levels of social investment occur be-
cause the limits on transfers from the central government stipulate high levels of investment
in health and education.
On each of my dependent variables, I run multi-level models. When I evaluate the
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Fig. 7: Margin of Victory in Mayoral Elections
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Fig. 8: Investment in Local Programs and Services
perceived level of democracy, I perform an ordered logit model since there are four ordered
categories 7 . However, when testing trust, I use a continuous scale from 1 to 7 and run the
multi-level model using Ordinary Least Squares regression.
Process-Based Cues
In order to test the effect of process-based cues on perceptions of the quality of democ-
racy, I run the following model:
7 I also run this as an ordered logit with robust standard errors in the appendix, see Table 11
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Quality of Democracy = β0 + β1Access to News Media + β2Economic Perception + β3Voted+
β4Education + β5Corruption + β6Number of Parties + β7Parties2+
β8Margin of Victory + β9Population (log) + β10Proportion Rural+
β11Conflict + 
(1)
As detailed above, β1 through β4 represent the individual level determinants and β5
through β11 represent municipal-level determinants. Within the multi-level model frame-
work, I allow the intercept to vary by municipality.
In hypothesis 1a, I predict that as the number of candidates competing increases, the
perception of quality of democracy increases at first and then decreases. As a result, I
expect that the coefficient on β6Number of Parties will be positive while the coefficient on
β7 Parties2 will be negative. This captures the idea that as more parties enter the political
system perceptions will initially improve before experiencing a “crowding out” effect.
In hypothesis 1b, I predict that as elections become more competitive, citizens’ percep-
tions of the quality of democracy will improve. As a result, I predict that as the margin of
victory decreases, meaning the difference in votes between the top candidates is smaller,
the perception of quality of democracy will increase. Thus, I expect the coefficient on
β8Margin of Victory to be negative.
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Results-Based Cues
I follow the same modeling structure when considering results-based cues. Thus, I test
the following model:
Quality of Democracy = β0 + β1Access to News Media + β2Economic Perception + β3Voted+
β4Education + β5Corruption + β6Population (log) + β7Proportion Rural+
β8Agriculture + β9Agriculture*Rural + β10Political Development+
β11Social Programs + β12Municipal Infrastructure + β13Conflict + 
(2)
This model follows the same structure as the model in equation 1. Here, I expect
the coefficients on β8 Agriculture, β10 Political Development, β11 Social Programs and β12
Municipal Infrastructure will all be positive so that increases in investment correspond with
increases in perceptions of the quality of democracy. This follows the expectations outlined
in Hypothesis 2.
I control for the effects of individual-level factors. I expect that as perception of the
countries economic condition improves, perceptions of quality of democracy will improve.
Since income and education are both associated with greater political awareness, I expect
that wealthier and more educated citizens will have a lower perception of the quality of
democracy so that these coefficients will be negative. Furthermore, citizens with higher
perceptions of corruption are likely to have lower evaluations of the quality of democracy.
Finally, I expect respondents in municipalities that have higher levels of experience with
conflict and larger populations will have lower perceptions of the quality of democracy.
This data does not sample from every municipality each year, so many municipalities
are not included in the analysis. However, since municipalities are sampled at random
across each region of Colombia, these municipalities represent Colombia’s population.
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Results and Analysis
I separate my analysis into an analysis of process-based and results-based cues. In each
of the models, I allow the intercepts to vary by municipality. Despite the random effects of
municipalities, the constant slopes allow me to consider the overall effect of each type of
signal that voters receive.
Process-Based Cues
There is limited support that municipal-level electoral cues change citizens perceptions
of the quality of national democracy. This is evident in Table 4.
The margin of victory for the winning mayoral candidate is not statistically significant
in citizens evaluations of the level of democracy or their trust in democracy. Thus, the level
of competitiveness does not appear to alter citizen’s evaluations of democracy.
When evaluating the effects of parties, however, I find mixed results. In order to evaluate
when the number of parties are statistically significant, I produce marginal effects to account
for the changes in the effect of parties across the number of parties. When evaluating the
level of democracy, the number of parties are not statistically significant. This implies that
the number of parties does not alter perceived levels of democracy.
However, the number of parties has a statistically significant effect on trust in democracy
from three through nine parties, as seen in Figure 9. Within this range, an increase in the
number of parties competing for mayor has an increasingly negative effect. Since the mean
number of parties across municipalities is 5 parties, the results indicate that the majority of
respondents find an increase in competing parties decreases their trust in democracy. These
results suggest that the increase in parties occurs beyond the observable range and that the
squared term is not appropriate 8 . The results hold when I control for rebel control of the
municipality.
The coefficients on parties and parties squared are both negative. This indicates that,
8 The results without the squared term are in the appendix in Table 10
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Level of Democracy Level of Democracy Trust in Democracy Trust in Democracy
b/se b/se b/se b/se
main
News Access 0.267** 0.311** 0.187** 0.216**
(0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05)
Economic Perceptions 0.413** 0.502** 0.301** 0.276**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
Education -0.025** -0.017 -0.035** -0.035**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Voted 0.313** 0.364** 0.150** 0.271**
(0.09) (0.11) (0.04) (0.06)
Population (log) 0.024 0.173** -0.062** -0.086**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
Proportion Rural 0.006 0.596 -0.238 -0.447*
(0.37) (0.45) (0.20) (0.27)
Gender -0.058 -0.060 0.040 0.003
(0.09) (0.10) (0.04) (0.06)
Perception of Corruption 0.034 0.067 -0.119** -0.080**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Parties -0.013 -0.045 -0.026 -0.029
(0.11) (0.16) (0.05) (0.10)
Parties2 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Margin of Victory -0.000 -0.008 0.002 0.002
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Rebel Groups -0.290* 0.069
(0.17) (0.10)
Intercept 4.265** 4.199**
(0.45) (0.58)
τ1 -0.810 1.275
(0.85) (0.99)
τ2 1.365 3.510**
(0.85) (0.99)
τ3 3.708** 5.698**
(0.86) (1.00)
Between-Municipality Variance 0.124** 0.095*
(0.05) (0.05)
Random Effects -1.599** -1.629**
(0.18) (0.24)
N 1977.000 1339.000 2706.000 1379.000
AIC 4512.530 3098.719 8216.820 4162.686
BIC 4596.370 3181.914 8299.465 4241.123
Table 4: Regression Results for Electoral Cues
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Fig. 9: Marginal Effect of the Number of Parties
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Fig. 10: Predicted Trust in Democracy Across Number of Parties
rather than an increase in parties competing initially improving perceptions of the qual-
ity of democracy before experiencing a “crowding out” that decreases the perceptions of
democracy, an increase in the number of parties will lower perceptions of the quality of
democracy at an increasing rate. Based on the marginal effect of the number of parties in
Figure 9, this effect is statistically significant from three through nine parties. This leads to
a more linear trend in Figure 10. When I restrict my analysis to where the effect of political
parties is statistically significant, 2585 of the 2706 survey respondents live in municipalities
with three through nine parties competing. This suggests that in Colombia, the number of
parties competing send a cue to citizens that democratic institutions are weak, thus lowering
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their trust in institutions from about 4.5 to 4 on the continuous, 7 point scale.
Neither the presence of rebel groups nor the proportion of the municipality that is rural
are statistically significant indicators of the level of democracy or trust in institutions at
p < 0.05. However, population has an inconsistent effect: when citizens are in larger
municipalities, they tend to see a higher level of democracy and have less trust in democracy.
At the individual level, those who consume more news, those with higher perceptions of
the national economy, and those who vote tend to have higher perceptions of the level of
democracy and trust in democracy while those who are more educated and who see a higher
level of corruption tend to see lower levels of democracy and have less trust in institutions.
Results-Based Cues
Similar to institutional cues, information concerning democratic outcomes also have
mixed effects on the perceived levels of democracy. I run these tests only for individuals’
perceptions in 2008 because there is a shortage of data available for 2010-2012 that prevents
me from properly estimating the effects of outcomes on the second wave of surveys.
The outcomes of municipal investment have a different effect on the perceived level of
democracy than the trust in democratic institutions. When considering the level of democ-
racy, increased investment in municipal infrastructure– composed of investment in prisons,
administration, municipal development, municipal spaces, and the justice system–is asso-
ciated with increases in the perceived level of democracy. This is evident in Table 5, where
investment in municipal infrastructure is positive and statistically significant when aver-
aged over the prior two years and averaged over the prior five years. These models account
for the delay from increases in spending and the observable effects of this investment that
can be witnessed by the population. These results hold when controlling for occupation of
rebel groups, although this occupation is not statistically significant 9 . As spending per
capita in the municipality increases, the predicted probability in seeing Colombia as “very
democratic” also increases.
9 These results can be found in the appendix in Table 12
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Investment Difference in Investment Investment Over 2 Years Investment Over 5 Years
b/se b/se b/se b/se
News Access 0.321** 0.315** 0.306** 0.311**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Economic Perception 0.496** 0.503** 0.498** 0.496**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Education -0.015 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Voted 0.335** 0.358** 0.338** 0.343**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Gender -0.056 -0.055 -0.061 -0.063
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Corruption 0.069 0.064 0.069 0.067
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Population (log) 0.016 0.136* 0.140* 0.132
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Proportion Rural 0.495 0.691 0.906 0.842
(0.53) (0.52) (0.59) (0.53)
Agriculture -0.047 0.081 0.065 0.019
(0.04) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture 0.002 -0.083 -0.114 -0.063
(0.06) (0.15) (0.07) (0.06)
Municipal Infrastructure 0.005 -0.001 0.007** 0.008**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Political Development -0.012 -0.023 -0.067 -0.068
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Social 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
τ1 0.109 1.382 1.619 1.391
(1.06) (1.12) (1.17) (1.21)
τ2 2.344** 3.633** 3.852** 3.623**
(1.06) (1.12) (1.17) (1.21)
τ3 4.532** 5.808** 6.040** 5.811**
(1.07) (1.13) (1.18) (1.22)
Between-Municipality Variance 0.086 0.127** 0.086* 0.099*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
N 1339.000 1317.000 1339.000 1339.000
AIC 3099.512 3056.181 3099.806 3101.607
BIC 3187.907 3144.294 3188.201 3190.002
Table 5: Effect of Quality of Governance Cues on Level of Democracy
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Fig. 11: Probability of Perceived Levels of Democracy Across Investment in Municipal Infrastruc-
ture
Substantively, increasing the investment in municipal development has large effect on
the probability that the respondent sees Colombia as “very democratic”. In Figure 11,av-
erage investment over the prior two years and average investment over the prior five years
see decreases in the proportion of respondents who see Colombia as “a little democratic”.
While the respondents are least likely to say that Colombia is “not democratic” and most
likely to say it is “somewhat democratic”, the categories “a little democratic” and “very
democratic” see substantial change. When I control for the effects of long-term investment
in the municipality in Figure 11d, the probability of seeing Colombia as “very democratic”
increases from 0.2 to about 0.4, a 20% increase in the proportion of respondents with higher
evaluations of Colombia. Conversely, the probability of evaluating Colombia as “a little
democratic” falls by the same magnitude.These results closely mirror the changes when
investment is averaged over two years.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Investment Difference in Investment Investment Over 2 Years Investment Over 5 Years
b/se b/se b/se b/se
News Access 0.221** 0.218** 0.216** 0.218**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Economic Perception 0.276** 0.281** 0.277** 0.275**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Education -0.036** -0.037** -0.036** -0.035**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Voted 0.268** 0.270** 0.269** 0.265**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Gender 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.002
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Perception of Corruption -0.080** -0.084** -0.080** -0.079**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Population (log) -0.104** -0.042 -0.058 -0.111**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Proportion Rural -0.199 -0.185 0.048 -0.318
(0.32) (0.29) (0.35) (0.30)
Agriculture -0.011 0.030 0.034 0.004
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture -0.014 -0.028 -0.070 -0.036
(0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03)
Municipal Infrastructure -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Political Development 0.028 -0.010 0.001 0.024
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Social 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Intercept 4.263** 3.758** 3.624** 4.519**
(0.63) (0.63) (0.69) (0.68)
Random Effects -1.665** -1.590** -1.673** -1.723**
(0.25) (0.24) (0.26) (0.28)
N 1379.000 1357.000 1379.000 1379.000
AIC 4161.089 4099.494 4162.917 4162.285
BIC 4244.755 4182.903 4246.583 4245.951
Table 6: Effect of Quality of Governance Cues on Trust in Democracy
However, investment in agriculture, social programs, and political development do not
have a statistically significant effect on perceived levels of democracy. Thus, while I find
some support for results-based cues influencing perceptions of the level of democracy, the
support is limited to improvements in the municipality and municipal operations.
When considering trust in democratic institutions and processes, the effect of outcomes
cues disappears, as seen in Table 6. Thus, citizens tend to consider outcomes when deter-
mining an overall level of democracy, but they consider their experiences with institutions,
such as elections, when determining their level of trust in democracy. Both level of democ-
racy and trust are components of a functioning democracy: in a high quality democracy,
citizens are likely to both see their country as democratic and trust that the institutions are
functioning. However, these two measures of the strength of democracy seem to be evalu-
ated using different metrics that test the overall quality of democracy.
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I focus on 2008 and 2012 because I suspect that during a Presidential election year,
the focus will be on national, rather than subnational, cues. Thus, in a presidential year, I
would not expect variance in municipalities to effect perceptions of the quality of democ-
racy because the primary source of information used to evaluate democracy will occur at the
national level. When I run the models on 2010, these expectations are supported: process-
based cues no longer effect the trust in democratic institutions and no categories of munici-
pal investment are statistically significant. Thus, municipal cues are most important outside
of the context of national level changes. 10
Discussion
I find weak support for the role of municipal level cues on perceptions of the quality
of democracy in Colombia. Municipal cues do have an influence on citizen’s evaluations,
however, these cues do not operate equally across different measures for the quality of
democracy. Overall, institutional cues that provide information about the process of demo-
cratic governance tend to influence the level of trust that citizens have in democracy while
results-based cues, which provide information about the outcomes of democracy, have an
effect on perceptions of the overall level of democracy.
Colombia has a multi-party system, where the modal number of parties competing for
mayor across respondents was five. My results, however, suggest that once a third party
enters a political system, the effect of adding additional parties is negative and statistically
significant through nine parties. In this framework, the structure of municipal competition
is sending a signal that lowers overall trust in democracy. It is possible that, in addition to
lowering trust, the number of candidates competing contributes to the high overall percep-
tions of corruption.
Despite these characteristics, the margin of victory does not seem to have an effect on
trust in democracy. In my sample, the margin of victory ranges from 0.03% of the vote to
56.73% of the vote. This suggests a large amount of variance in the level of competition
10 The full results can be found in the appendix in Tables 7 8 and 9
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in mayoral elections. People, however, tend to respond more to the number of candidates
competing than to the level of competition.
The importance of municipal infrastructure cues may be specific to Colombia. While the
presence of rebel groups does not have a statistically significant effect on trust in democ-
racy or level of democracy, the context of the Colombian civil war may increase the im-
portance of a strong justice system and prison system on citizens’ overall perceptions of
the level of democracy. Furthermore, one of the components for determining the level of
central-government transfers to municipalities is the strength of the municipal infrastruc-
ture. Strong municipal infrastructure is necessary to perform daily governance operations
during ongoing threats to security and to continue to receive transfers that can be invested
elsewhere. Thus, investment in municipal infrastructure likely offers a minimum threshold
for outcomes in the same way that elections provide a first threshold for classification as a
democracy.
These results suggest that cues for both democratic processes and outcomes influence
citizens’ evaluations of national democracy. In a weak democracy, citizens tend to be re-
sponsive to minimal cues, seeing changes in base characteristics, such as the number of
parties competing for mayor and the strength of municipal governance, as stronger signals
for the state of democracy than more nuanced measures such as the level of competition and
investment in increasing political participation at the municipal level. Minimal support for
my hypotheses indicates that, in Colombia, institutional cues are more likely to influence
trust in democratic institutions and processes while results-based cues are more likely to
influence the perceived level of democracy. Weak support for the importance of municipal
experiences in shaping national level perceptions suggests that this could be explored in a
cross-national setting where Colombia is compared to cases with a federal framework or
to countries with weaker levels of decentralization to explore how the information derived
from local experiences influences perceptions of the quality of democracy elsewhere.
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APPENDIXNational Level Cues
National-level cues continue to effect citizens perceptions of democracy. I discounted
2010, due to the national presidential election, since in this information environment. I
present the results of each of my main models for 2010. The results change drastically.
Municipal elections now take on a “U” shape, rather than the inverted “U” I predicted, but
only have statistical significance for three through six parties. This gives limited credibility
to an ongoing importance of the 2007 municipal election. When considering outcomes, the
difference in municipal spending is the only statistically significant finding.
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Fig. 12: Marginal Effect of the Number of Parties
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Fig. 13: Predicted Trust in Democracy Across Parties
When considering democratic results using investment, there is no longer statistical sig-
nificance in any categories. Investment in municipal development is statistically significant
for the difference in spending at p < 0.1 for perceived level of democracy and at p < 0.05
for trust in democracy. However, while some statistical significance remains, this is differ-
ent than the findings in a non-national election year.
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(1) (2)
Level of Democracy Trust in Democracy
b/se b/se
News Access 0.022 0.124**
(0.09) (0.05)
Economic Perception 0.338** 0.365**
(0.06) (0.04)
Education -0.023* -0.022**
(0.01) (0.01)
Voted 0.410** 0.214**
(0.11) (0.06)
Population (log) -0.029 -0.009
(0.06) (0.04)
Proportion Rural 0.036 -0.057
(0.41) (0.26)
Gender 0.024 0.145**
(0.10) (0.06)
Perception of Corruption -0.065 -0.163**
(0.07) (0.04)
Parties 0.051 -0.119
(0.15) (0.09)
Parties2 -0.004 0.006
(0.01) (0.01)
Margin of Victory -0.004 -0.003
(0.01) (0.00)
Intercept 4.009**
(0.59)
τ1 -2.559**
(0.94)
τ2 -0.533
(0.94)
τ3 1.736*
(0.94)
Between-Municipality Variance 0.100*
(0.05)
Random Effects -1.420**
(0.19)
N 1359.000 1400.000
AIC 3146.475 4203.444
BIC 3224.692 4276.863
Table 7: Regression Results for Electoral Cues, 2010
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Investment Difference in Investment Investment Over 2 Years Investment Over 5 Years
b/se b/se b/se b/se
News Access 0.027 0.009 0.027 0.030
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Economic Perception 0.343** 0.342** 0.341** 0.341**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Education -0.022* -0.020 -0.023* -0.022*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Voted 0.405** 0.423** 0.407** 0.405**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Gender 0.024 0.009 0.025 0.025
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Perception of Corruption -0.057 -0.063 -0.068 -0.065
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Population (log) -0.125* -0.066 -0.014 -0.048
(0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
Proportion Rural -0.248 -0.282 0.365 0.194
(0.54) (0.43) (0.55) (0.61)
Agriculture -0.058 -0.017 0.026 -0.000
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture 0.038 0.039 -0.059 -0.037
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Municipal Infrastructure -0.002 0.003* 0.000 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Political Development 0.027 -0.020 0.007 0.007
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Social 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
τ1 -3.729** -3.257** -2.364** -2.862**
(1.09) (0.93) (1.13) (1.20)
τ2 -1.704 -1.235 -0.339 -0.837
(1.08) (0.93) (1.13) (1.20)
τ3 0.564 1.068 1.930* 1.431
(1.08) (0.93) (1.13) (1.20)
Between-Municipality Variance 0.077 0.079 0.097* 0.094*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
N 1359.000 1335.000 1359.000 1359.000
AIC 3146.317 3075.068 3149.842 3149.778
BIC 3234.964 3163.412 3238.489 3238.424
Table 8: 2010 Effect of Results cues on Level of Democracy
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Investment Difference in Investment Investment Over 2 Years Investment Over 5 Years
b/se b/se b/se b/se
News Access 0.123** 0.126** 0.124** 0.125**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Economic Perception 0.364** 0.375** 0.365** 0.364**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Education -0.023** -0.023** -0.022** -0.023**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Voted 0.219** 0.221** 0.219** 0.216**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Gender 0.144** 0.146** 0.146** 0.146**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Perception of Corruption -0.159** -0.153** -0.159** -0.158**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Population (log) -0.106** -0.068 -0.094* -0.100*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Proportion Rural -0.015 -0.247 0.083 -0.010
(0.35) (0.27) (0.35) (0.39)
Agriculture -0.025 -0.015 -0.012 -0.027
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture -0.003 0.029 -0.024 -0.004
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Municipal Infrastructure -0.001 0.003** -0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Political Development 0.035* -0.005 0.031 0.021
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Social 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Intercept 4.497** 4.254** 4.299** 4.466**
(0.71) (0.59) (0.71) (0.78)
Random Effects -1.499** -1.523** -1.456** -1.430**
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)
N 1400.000 1376.000 1400.000 1400.000
AIC 4204.217 4133.137 4206.296 4207.955
BIC 4288.125 4216.768 4290.203 4291.863
Table 9: 2010 Effect of Results Cues on Trust in Democracy
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Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Level of Democracy Level fo Democracy Trust in Democracy Trust in Democracy
b/se b/se b/se b/se
News Access 0.267** 0.311** 0.187** 0.216**
(0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05)
Economic Perception 0.413** 0.502** 0.301** 0.276**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
Education -0.025** -0.017 -0.035** -0.035**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Voted 0.312** 0.364** 0.150** 0.271**
(0.09) (0.11) (0.04) (0.06)
Population (log) 0.025 0.176** -0.061** -0.081*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
Proportion Rural 0.000 0.602 -0.245 -0.438
(0.37) (0.45) (0.20) (0.27)
Gender -0.059 -0.060 0.040 0.002
(0.09) (0.10) (0.04) (0.06)
Perception of Corruption 0.034 0.067 -0.119** -0.080**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Parties -0.039 -0.079** -0.049** -0.021
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Margin of Victory -0.000 -0.008 0.002 0.002
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Rebel -0.296* 0.060
(0.16) (0.10)
Intercept 4.319** 4.276**
(0.43) (0.56)
τ1 -0.870 1.224
(0.82) (0.96)
τ2 1.305 3.459**
(0.82) (0.96)
τ3 3.648** 5.647**
(0.82) (0.97)
Between-Municipality Variance 0.125** 0.095*
(0.05) (0.05)
Random Effects -1.596** -1.622**
(0.18) (0.24)
N 1977.000 1339.000 2706.000 1379.000
AIC 4510.588 3096.765 8215.022 4160.980
BIC 4588.839 3174.760 8291.764 4234.188
Table 10: Electoral Cues Without Parties Squared
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Level of Democracy Level of Democracy Trust in Democracy Trust in Democracy
b/se b/se b/se b/se
News Access 0.267** 0.307** 0.191** 0.221**
(0.08) (0.10) (0.04) (0.05)
Economic Perceptions 0.411** 0.501** 0.306** 0.282**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
Education -0.025** -0.018 -0.035** -0.036**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Voted 0.321** 0.389** 0.154** 0.282**
(0.09) (0.11) (0.04) (0.06)
Population (log) 0.018 0.122** -0.064** -0.079**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
Proportion Rural -0.030 0.429 -0.280** -0.475**
(0.28) (0.34) (0.14) (0.19)
Gender -0.054 -0.057 0.040 0.003
(0.09) (0.10) (0.04) (0.06)
Perception of Corruption 0.035 0.068 -0.128** -0.084**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
Parties -0.003 -0.073 -0.022 0.017
(0.09) (0.12) (0.05) (0.07)
Parties2 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Margin of Victory -0.002 -0.006 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rebel -0.279** 0.065
(0.13) (0.08)
Intercept 4.296** 4.185**
(0.31) (0.43)
τ1 -0.863 0.686
(0.61) (0.75)
τ2 1.289** 2.901**
(0.61) (0.74)
τ3 3.584** 5.050**
(0.61) (0.75)
N 1977.000 1339.000 2706.000 1379.000
AIC 4520.421 3103.918 8228.213 4166.671
BIC 4598.672 3181.914 8299.052 4234.650
Table 11: Electoral Cues With Robust Standard Errors
42
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Investment Difference in Investment Investment Over 2 Years Investment Over 5 Years
b/se b/se b/se b/se
News Access 0.319** 0.311** 0.303** 0.310**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Economic Perception 0.495** 0.505** 0.498** 0.496**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Education -0.015 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Voted 0.336** 0.361** 0.339** 0.344**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Gender -0.054 -0.052 -0.060 -0.061
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Perception of Corruption 0.073 0.068 0.072 0.069
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Population (log) 0.068 0.230** 0.192** 0.186*
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
Proportion Rural 0.834 1.187** 1.272** 1.228**
(0.56) (0.56) (0.62) (0.57)
Agriculture -0.042 0.092 0.073 0.022
(0.04) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture -0.010 -0.102 -0.130* -0.079
(0.06) (0.15) (0.07) (0.06)
Municipal Infrastructure 0.004 -0.002 0.006** 0.007*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Political Development -0.009 -0.032 -0.065 -0.062
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Social 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rebel -0.246 -0.366** -0.245 -0.286*
(0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17)
τ1 0.712 2.368** 2.260* 1.987
(1.11) (1.19) (1.22) (1.24)
τ2 2.946** 4.618** 4.494** 4.219**
(1.11) (1.19) (1.23) (1.24)
τ3 5.134** 6.792** 6.681** 6.407**
(1.11) (1.20) (1.23) (1.25)
Between-Municipality Variance 0.074 0.105* 0.076 0.087*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
N 1339.000 1317.000 1339.000 1339.000
AIC 3099.122 3054.265 3099.460 3100.732
BIC 3192.717 3147.561 3193.054 3194.326
Table 12: Effect of Quality of Governance Cues on Level of Democracy, Including Rebel Occupa-
tion
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Investment Difference in Investment Investment Over 2 Years Investment Over 5 Years
b/se b/se b/se b/se
News Access 0.320** 0.311** 0.298** 0.305**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Economic Perception 0.492** 0.501** 0.495** 0.492**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Education -0.016 -0.020 -0.018 -0.019
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Voted 0.328** 0.363** 0.331** 0.341**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Gender -0.048 -0.046 -0.056 -0.058
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Perception of Corruption 0.072 0.063 0.070 0.069
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Population (log) 0.010 0.115** 0.129** 0.112
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Proportion Rural 0.484 0.604* 0.878* 0.769*
(0.41) (0.36) (0.46) (0.43)
Agriculture -0.042 0.065 0.065 0.018
(0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture -0.003 -0.058 -0.113* -0.061
(0.05) (0.12) (0.06) (0.04)
Municipal Infrastructure 0.005** -0.001 0.007** 0.007**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Political Development -0.014 -0.030 -0.058* -0.064*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Social 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
τ1 0.063 1.124 1.483 1.162
(0.81) (0.82) (0.94) (0.99)
τ2 2.281** 3.349** 3.700** 3.375**
(0.81) (0.82) (0.94) (0.99)
τ3 4.436** 5.476** 5.854** 5.525**
(0.81) (0.82) (0.95) (1.00)
N 1339.000 1317.000 1339.000 1339.000
AIC 3101.709 3063.042 3102.275 3105.487
BIC 3184.904 3145.972 3185.470 3188.682
Table 13: Effect of Quality of Governance Cues on Level of Democracy, Robust Standard Errors
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Investment Difference in Investment Investment Over 2 Years Investment Over 5 Years
b/se b/se b/se b/se
News Access 0.221** 0.219** 0.216** 0.218**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Economic Perception 0.276** 0.281** 0.277** 0.276**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Education -0.036** -0.037** -0.036** -0.035**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Voted 0.269** 0.270** 0.269** 0.265**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Gender 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.002
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Perception of Corruption -0.080** -0.085** -0.080** -0.080**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Population (log) -0.107** -0.055 -0.060 -0.124**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Proportion Rural -0.219 -0.255 0.029 -0.404
(0.34) (0.33) (0.38) (0.32)
Agriculture -0.011 0.028 0.034 0.004
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture -0.013 -0.025 -0.069 -0.033
(0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03)
Municipal Infrastructure -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Political Development 0.028 -0.009 0.001 0.023
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Social 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rebel 0.015 0.051 0.013 0.063
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Intercept 4.299** 3.897** 3.658** 4.653**
(0.67) (0.69) (0.73) (0.70)
Random Effects -1.667** -1.594** -1.674** -1.737**
(0.26) (0.24) (0.26) (0.28)
N 1379.000 1357.000 1379.000 1379.000
AIC 4163.066 4101.263 4164.900 4163.860
BIC 4251.961 4189.884 4253.795 4252.755
Table 14: Effect of Quality of Governance Cues on Trust in Democracy, Including Rebel Occupation
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Investment Difference in Investment Investment Over 2 Years Investment Over 5 Years
b/se b/se b/se b/se
News Access 0.229** 0.223** 0.221** 0.223**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Economic Perception 0.281** 0.287** 0.282** 0.280**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Education -0.037** -0.038** -0.037** -0.036**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Voted 0.279** 0.280** 0.278** 0.270**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Gender 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.003
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Perception of Corruption -0.085** -0.090** -0.084** -0.083**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Population (log) -0.101** -0.042 -0.063* -0.110**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Proportion Rural -0.255 -0.216 -0.035 -0.335
(0.24) (0.22) (0.27) (0.24)
Agriculture -0.007 0.039 0.034 0.005
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture -0.015 -0.043 -0.067* -0.037
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02)
Municipal Infrastructure -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Political Development 0.023 -0.004 0.004 0.025
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Social 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Intercept 4.254** 3.775** 3.724** 4.507**
(0.48) (0.50) (0.56) (0.54)
N 1379.000 1357.000 1379.000 1379.000
AIC 4164.150 4104.408 4165.872 4163.634
BIC 4237.357 4177.390 4239.079 4236.842
Table 15: Effect of Quality of Governance Cues on Trust in Democracy, Robust Standard Errors
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